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Abstract
A central debate in bioethics is whether parents should try to influence the genetic basis
of their children’s traits. We argue that the case for using mate selection, embryo
selection, and other interventions to enhance heritable traits like intelligence is strength-
ened by the fact that they seem to have positive network effects. These network effects
include increased cooperation in collective action problems, which contributes to social
trust and prosperity. We begin with an overview of evidence for these claims, and then
argue that if individual welfare is largely a function of group traits, parents should try to
preserve or enhance cognitive traits that have positive network effects.
Keywords Intelligence.Patience.Cognitiveenhancement .Moralenhancement .Network
effects
1 Introduction
Many traits that we value are the product of evolution by natural and sexual selection.
Evolution is a blind process that causes heritable traits that increase fitness to proliferate. It
does not necessarily favor traits—or levels of a trait—that are optimal from the perspective
of our well-being or the long-term survival of our species (Powell and Buchanan, 2011).
We are lucky. We have the power to understand the process that produced us, reflect
on the traits that make our lives go better, and try to steer evolution in a direction that
we choose. At least some of the traits that nature has bequeathed us can increase our
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well-being independent of their effects on our ability to survive and reproduce.
Heritable traits like intelligence, empathy, and creativity can lead us to produce lasting
achievements that we value, ranging from great works of art and scientific discovery to
meaningful relationships.
Some of these traits also predict cooperation at a group level. We review evidence
indicating that when average intelligence is raised in a population, perhaps up to some
threshold, each member of the group is likely to lead a better life than if intelligence
were relatively low. We then argue that standard considerations in favor of genetic
enhancement are strengthened by these network effects.1 Finally, we argue that since
we cannot count on either uncoordinated individual choice or centralized state power to
produce patterns in which average abilities are raised, we should explore the conditions
under which norms are likely to emerge that direct us to make socially beneficial
reproductive choices.
1.1 How Group Traits Affect Individual Welfare
Sometimes the whole is more than the sum of its parts. In this section, we review the
evidence for a connection between the average traits of a group and the success of the
individuals who comprise it. While we focus on general intelligence, in part because it
is so widely studied, scientists are beginning to uncover the genetic roots of other
psychological traits that have similar properties (Plomin, 2018). Examples include
individualism, and the tendency to defer to impersonal rules rather than kinship
loyalties, which some argue were inadvertently selected for via marriage patterns and
social norms imposed by the Catholic Church in Western Europe (Schulz et al., 2019).
As usual, Charles Darwin anticipated the broad claim we’re making: “It is most
difficult to say why one civilised nation rises, becomes more powerful, and spreads
more widely, than another; or why the same nation progresses more at one time than at
another. We can only say that it depends on an increase in the actual number of the
population, on the number of men endowed with high intellectual and moral faculties,
as well as on their standard of excellence” (1871, p. 140). The welfare of groups
depends on both the heritable traits of those who comprise them, and on the moral
norms and political institutions that create social order.
Humans are the only animal species whose members routinely and peacefully
cooperate with other unrelated members of the same species (Seabright, 2004). Adam
Smith pointed out a version of this claim when he said that humans have a propensity to
“truck, barter, and exchange” (1776, Book 1, Chapter 2). While anthropologists have
debated just how universal that propensity is, it’s entirely accurate to say that exchange
is vastly more common among humans than among other animal species.
Economic exchange is only the most elementary form of cooperation. Working on
team projects and sharing the benefits, helping a neighbor plow the snow in her
1 Network effects occur when adding another user of a good or another person with a trait to a population
tends to make others within that population better off. For example, as more people adopted personal
computers, the value of owning one increased, and so did the power of computers to help us accomplish
our goals. In other words, network effects are positive externalities that increase as the number of users of a
good or people with a trait increase in a population. Throughout the paper we will use “network effect” to
mean positive network effects, even though this term is occasionally applied to traits or technologies that have
increasingly negative effects as they are adopted.
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driveway after a storm, giving up a little in this month’s political battle because that’s
better than raising the probability of a low-grade civil war: all are examples of
cooperation based on long-run reciprocity, which helps make the group better off even
if the individual has to pay a short-run cost.
The canonical metaphor for such behavior—for trusting one’s partner today in the
hope of building a lasting, productive relationship—is the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
If people enter a prisoner’s dilemma thinking they’re just playing a one-time game, then
a rational person who has no fellow-feeling for his opponent has only one reasonable
option: defect—in other words, don’t be taken for a sucker. But if the same game is
repeated for a long time—either endlessly or with a modest chance of ending each
round—then a new, pro-social outcome becomes possible, and a strategy of conditional
cooperation becomes rational even in the absence of altruistic motivation.
If we know we’ll be meeting the same partner each day for a long time, and we each
need to decide whether to trust or distrust each other that day, this one-time game is
converted into an entirely new game, a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, even if the benefits
and costs of one-time trust and distrust remain unchanged. In this repeated game, if we
both start off playing nice the first day, and then after that first success each player
decides to do whatever the other player did the day before, then we’ve entered the
world of Tit-for-Tat, a strategy first formalized by the psychologist Anatol Rapaport,
but anticipated by the biologist Robert Trivers and game theorist John von Neumann.
If both players follow a Tit-for-Tat rule, we’ll see harmonious cooperation, with each
player encouraging the other to cooperate through the threat of retaliation. The magic of
a credible threat of retaliation is that it doesn’t have to be implemented to work. Tit-for-
Tat is a successful strategy when each party values the future benefits of harmony more
than the present joys of cheating; a faithful marriage might be a useful analogy. There
are real benefits to forming a lasting union with a partner even if there are immediate
advantages to cheating.
Social emotions like love, shame, and guilt evolved in part to impose additional
psychological costs on cheaters (Darwin 1872, Frank 1988). Rational people with pro-
social emotions can become trustworthy traders because they see the advantages of Tit-
for-Tat, but also because they are known to exhibit ‘strong’ reciprocity that includes a
sense of pride in following mutually beneficial strategies, and shame in being the first
to break from such a strategy (Frank 2001, Bowles and Gintis 2011, Anomaly 2017).2
Patience is another important cognitive trait that fosters our ability to follow a strategy
of long-run reciprocity: the threat of punishment looms larger in the minds of people
who are more patient.
As Jones (2016, Ch. 4) discusses, there is a vast empirical literature spanning
psychology and economics showing that intelligence scores are a useful predictor of
patience, of foresighted behavior. Whether it’s people in a lab experiment being asked
hypothetical questions about whether they’d rather have $50 today or $75 in a year, or
2 Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis distinguish a ‘weak’ disposition to play Tit-for-Tat with ‘strong’ reciprocity,
which includes moral emotions associated with justice: “In experiments we commonly observe that people
sacrifice their own payoffs in order to cooperate with others, to reward the cooperation of others, and to punish
free-riding even when they cannot expect to gain from acting this way. We call the preferences motivating this
behavior strong reciprocity, the term “strong” intended to distinguish this set of preferences from entirely
amoral and self-regarding reciprocation that would not be undertaken in the absence of some payback” (2011,
p. 20).
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enlisted members of the U.S. military deciding whether to take a (genuine) $10,000
lump-sum payment now rather than a thousand dollars a year for twenty years, people
who get higher scores on IQ tests tend to place more weight on the future.
And this willingness to focus on the future shows up in cooperation games as well.
Of the four reported experiments where investigators checked to see if the average IQ
of a pair of players predicted average rates of cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, the correlation was positive in all four, and statistically significant in three of
the four. The most recent study (Proto et al., 2019) conforms quite closely to the
scenario described above: students took an IQ test as part of an experiment, and then
were brought in on a later day to play a repeated prisoner’s dilemma that had (in some
cases) a 25% probability of ending each round. Unbeknownst to the students, on that
second day, students were paired by IQ score: students with above above-average
scores were paired with each other, and likewise with the below-average scoring
students. And the pairs of players with above-average scores were exceptionally likely
to reach 100% rates of cooperation, while those with below-average scores cooperated
much less often.
Note the relevant finding here: it’s not that higher-IQ individuals are more cooper-
ative, other things equal. It’s that higher-IQ pairs are more cooperative. Smarter people
aren’t nicer as a rule—although they do appear in experiments to have some tendency
to start off nicer in a game, perhaps in an attempt to get cooperation off the ground. The
apparent kindness of the intelligent in the early rounds of these games is consistent with
enlightened self-interest, of making a risky investment now that might pay off by
creating a bigger pie down the road. Jones (2016) refers to this kind of shrewd, pie-
growing, intelligence as “Coasian Intelligence,” after economic Nobelist Ronald Coase.
The Coase Theorem showed that if people are good at bargaining, and if bargaining
costs are low, people can always find a bargain that maximizes social welfare even if
their society has started off with bad, inefficient rules. Wise people can bargain around
bad rules. Coasian Intelligence is a step beyond Machiavellian intelligence—the more
cynical view that human intelligence is an evolved tool that helps us exploit other
people. Coasian Intelligence reminds us that often the best way to exploit another
person is to make that person better off—and it appears that higher-IQ groups of
players can do that in the lab.
But do these lab lessons extend to the real world? Is it likely that by raising the
average measured intelligence of a group we will increase conventionally measured
levels of social capital, trust and trustworthiness, and other indicators of social well-
being? Or are these experiments just reporting that smarter people are better at playing
mentally demanding games?
One way of responding to these questions is that life is itself a mentally demanding
game. A well-cited paper in psychology is entitled “Everyday Life as an Intelligence
Test” (Gordon, 1997). Equally, one could entitle a paper “Everyday Life as a Repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Our lives are social, success relies on repeated interactions with
those around us, and many of us behave differently when the time horizon appears
short—so the analogy from the lab to the real-world isn’t much of a stretch. At the same
time, other evidence can be brought to bear on the question of whether high group
intelligence is likely to create higher, more effective levels of social intelligence. One
form of evidence is that people with higher IQs tend to do noticeably better on tests of
emotional intelligence. The most famous, most academically robust measure of
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emotional intelligence, the MSCEIT, has a moderate correlation with IQ, around 0.2
(Jones, 2016). Smarter individuals are more likely to be able to read the emotions of
others and better able to create plausible solutions to emotionally difficult situations.
And when IQ tests and the MSCEIT are run in a horse race to see which better predicts
work performance, the IQ test wins easily.
The only important empirical question is whether the MSCEIT helps a little in
predicting work performance when used along with an IQ test or whether it’s just acting
as a low-quality IQ test. If we value living around people who are emotionally
intelligent and reasonably pro-social, then raising the average IQ of groups appears
to be a useful path to that goal.
Another key channel through which the cognitive skills of our neighbors is likely to
matter is through voting. Whether voters are well-informed or poorly-informed can
have a large effect on policy outcomes, and those with higher IQs are more likely to
have accurate information about government just as they’re more likely to have
accurate information about everything else—indeed, a wide-ranging trivia test is part
of any typical long-form IQ test. And Caplan and Miller (2010) show that at least
within the U.S., those with higher IQs are more likely to support market-oriented
policies, a relationship that survives a number of statistical controls including income
and education. Nations with more residents who can see Adam Smith’s invisible hand
are more likely to support market-oriented policies, and politicians who worry about
the unintended consequences of intuitively-appealing government interventions. Voting
is a world of side effects, where the political attitudes of my neighbors shape the
policies that I’ll be living under. So genetic and environmental interventions that raise
the mental skills of the average citizen in my country will tend to improve the political
system I live under, and thereby tend to improve my life.
Taken together, these relationships between group IQ and Coasian cooperation, and
between group IQ and informed voting mean that we should expect to see less corrupt,
more market-oriented policies in countries with higher test scores. A variety of papers
have found this to be the case, even after controlling for other confounding factors.
Potrafke (2012), Jones and Potrafke (2014), and Kanyama (2014) have all reported
robust relationships between national average IQ and a variety of measures of national
quality of economic institutions. The first two of these papers also showed that the
result holds for another measure of national test scores as well, one derived from the
PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS international schooling assessments. The lab and survey
evidence appear consistent with the cross-country data: Our neighbors shape our
government, so it’s reasonable to believe that cognitive enhancements that improve
our neighbors intelligence will tend to improve our governments.
In addition to these political channels of cognitive enhancement, the well-established
finding that the intelligent tend to be more frugal and farsighted means that they’re
likely to have higher rates of savings, a predicted correlation that holds across countries
(Jones, 2016, ch. 4). And since a surprisingly high fraction of a nation’s savings appears
to be “locked” inside one’s own country—a finding known as the Feldstein-Horioka
savings puzzle—then if a sizable number of people in our nation become more frugal,
our entire nation tends to benefit, because a sizable portion of those additional
investment funds tend to stay in our nation. This helps even those citizens who aren’t
so frugal: if your bank has a lot of funds to loan out because your neighbors are frugal,
that helps you when you apply for a loan, even if you’re not particularly frugal yourself.
Philosophia
Those funds, once lent out, can build the local stock of physical capital and thereby
boost local productivity. Frugal neighbors help all of us, even the not so frugal.
Those with higher IQ scores also tend to differ from others when it comes to taking
risks. They’re more willing to take the kinds of risks involved when one invests in
stocks—in particular, they tend to have a lower degree of risk aversion (Dohmen et al.,
2010). Likewise, a recent review article coauthored by Nobel laureate James Heckman
reports that risk-tolerance was greater both for those with higher scores on a verbal IQ
test as well as on a visual pattern-finding IQ test (Almlund et al., 2011). Similar results
were reported in a study of Chilean high school students: “We find that higher cognitive
ability–especially mathematical ability–is predictive of much lower levels of small-
stakes risk aversion.” (Benjamin et al., 2013).
But do these experimental results linking test scores and risk tolerance show up in
the real world? Or is this just a lab result? The answer matters for asset allocation and
very likely for long-run economic performance, since young firms and innovative firms
tend to be high-risk ventures that often fail or underperform, but which can hand out
handsome rewards to those willing to bear the risk, and which on average are high-
return investments. If IQ-type mental abilities influence risk-taking, this would shape
the entire economy. Drawing on an astonishingly wide collection of Finnish datasets—
and drawing in part on IQ tests given to Finnish citizens entering mandatory military
service—Grinblatt et al. (2011) report that IQ appears to have a bigger effect than
income on stock market participation. The overall pattern of results has been replicated
for a broad European sample. According to Christelis et al, “the propensity to invest in
stocks is strongly associated with cognitive abilities, for both direct stock market
participation and indirect participation through mutual funds and retirement accounts”
(2010, p. 18).
Less intelligent people know they are more likely to be ripped off in the stock
market, and this is likely a reason they shun it—a wise choice for them as individuals.
But it means fewer risky gambles for the nation as a whole—gambles that, in the
aggregate, tend to generate innovation and higher productivity. The intelligent are also
more likely to steer their funds prudently, taking risks while simultaneously managing
those risks. Having a larger group of citizens who are informed enough, patient enough,
and risk-tolerant enough to fund promising risky ventures is a path to national
prosperity.
In the richest countries, the most economically crucial sectors tend to be exception-
ally complex, with differing elements that require coordinating across thousands of
workers. Auto manufacturing, telecommunications equipment, pharmaceuticals, and
blockbuster moviemaking are just a few examples. If a weak movie score reduces a
blockbuster movie’s sales by just 1%, that mistake could cost the production company
ten million dollars. Economist Michael Kremer (1993) showed that in such an
economy—an O-ring economy, as he called it, since a single mistake could be as
disastrous as the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, caused by a single faulty O-
ring—it’s exceptionally important to pair the best workers with each other.
The skills of our neighbors influence the tasks our economy can take on: this finding
is backed up by recent studies showing that countries with higher average IQs have
higher levels of economic complexity as proxied by Ricardo Hausmann’s new Eco-
nomic Complexity Index (Azam, 2017). Unsurprisingly, this correlation survives a
variety of controls for possible confounds. The mental abilities associated with a high
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IQ include the ability to keep lots of facts in mind at once—a form of mental
multitasking. And once we recall the higher average emotional intelligence of the
conventionally intelligent, it’s little surprise that nations with higher standardized test
scores tend to take on the most economically complex tasks.
Since our neighbors shape the economic options available to us—they shape the
economic rules we live by, the amount of money available at our banks, the types of
business plans that are funded, and the level of complexity of our most important
businesses—policies that improve our neighbors’ cognitive skills will very likely tend
to increase our individual prosperity. The best studied of these cognitive skills is human
intelligence, proxied by IQ scores. Other traits that could have large spillover effects
should also be explored. Conscientiousness is a leading candidate, as is patience, which
some economists are exploring as an independent factor in shaping the wealth of
nations (Dohmen et al., 2010). Economies are social processes, and social processes
are made up of interactions between individuals. This is one reason it is important to
understand which traits have strong network effects and which do not.
1.2 Moral Reasons for Cognitive Enhancement
A number of influential moral philosophers have defended the view that we should use
biomedical technology to enhance cognition and moral character. A common argument
for enhancing cognition is that since general intelligence predicts well-being on a wide
variety of measures, ranging from physical health and financial success to mental health
and relationship stability (Plomin and Deary, 2015), prospective parents should think
about the cognitive characteristics of their kids (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). An
argument for enhancing empathy (or other traits that underlie pro-social behavior) is
that people with higher levels of affective empathy are more likely to contribute to
public goods or cooperate in collective action problems (Persson and Savulescu,
2017).3 In short, a number of arguments have been given in favor of cognitive
enhancement, and moral enhancement. But if the evidence above is right, cognitive
enhancement can also be thought of as a form of moral enhancement.
This is true in at least two ways. First, if cognitive enhancement produces better
outcomes, including greater material wealth, this is good from a moral point of view to
the extent that human welfare matters. Second, wealthier societies with high levels of
trust make it less risky for people to behave generously. Even people with benevolent
motives are less likely to behave generously when they think others are a threat (Powell
and Buchanan, 2016). To some extent, then, cognitive enhancement can be seen as a
form of moral enhancement. More to the point, there are moral reasons to cognitively
enhance people, provided it is safe to do so, if smarter people tend to create the
conditions for more productive social interactions. As Allen Buchanan argues, “any
enhancement that increases human productivity will tend to have network effects,
because if more people are individually more productive, they will be able to work
together more productively” (2011, p. 118).
3 Though, importantly, the most obvious way of doing this involves manipulating oxytocin – a drug which
increases parochial altruism, and ethnocentrism, not unconditional or universal altruism (De Dreu et al.,
2010). It is unclear whether it’s possible, or even desirable, to simply increase general empathy toward all
people.
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Philosophers can learn a lot from the sciences. In particular, evolutionary biologists
can give us a sense of the psychological mechanisms that helped our ancestors
cooperate in collective action problems. Economists have a different but complemen-
tary toolkit that highlights how incentives work in groups of different sizes, how
transaction costs and information asymmetries affect collective action, and how insti-
tutions can shape our preferences in ways that are conducive to cooperation and
prosperity. Although scientists can show us some of the conditions under which
cooperation is more likely to materialize, they cannot tell us how we ought to organize
societies, all things considered.
One of the goals political institutions should try to achieve is to create conditions in
which people tend to make socially beneficial reproductive choices – that is, choices
that are likely to benefit their own children (Savulescu and Kahane, 2009), and other
people with whom their children will interact (Douglas and Devolder, 2013). As John
Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice, people concerned with intergenerational justice
should be motivated to create institutions that “insure for their descendants the best
genetic endowment (assuming their own to be fixed). The pursuit of reasonable policies
in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones” (1971, p. 107).
Generally, this will involve leaving parents free to influence the traits of their children
through mate selection, embryo selection, and gene editing.4 But individual choices
always occur against the backdrop of social norms, which are shaped by legal institu-
tions. So it’s worth thinking about which kinds of political institutions are likely to
create the conditions for socially beneficial reproductive norms to emerge (Gyngell and
Douglas 2015, Anomaly 2020).5
According to legal scholar Richard McAdams, norms are “informal social regular-
ities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty,
because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both” (1997, p. 340). When they
work well, norms help us economize on information, and make choices that benefit
large groups of people in ways that members of the group don’t fully understand
(Hayek, 1960). Simple examples of social norms are rules that indicate how we should
greet one another, which forms of dress are appropriate at a wedding or a funeral, and
what counts as a fair way to allocate scarce resources in a group. While social norms
differ between societies in ways that reflect local conditions, they help coordinate
people’s choices without any one person needing to think much about the origin or
content of the norms they follow.
Norms are often more desirable than government mandates as ways of coordinating
our actions. This is especially true of reproductive choices. Even if future people will be
better off if current people make responsible choices, politicians typically lack the
incentives and information to appropriately manage our choice to have kids. Moreover,
laws can be more expensive to enforce than norms since they require an army of paid
police officers, a costly system of courts, and sometimes objectionable incursions on
4 We think that in the near future embryo selection using gametes derived from induced pluripotent stem cells
is the most likely technology to significantly raise the cognitive capacities of future people. The process might
be sped up dramatically by using iterated embryo selection (Sparrow, 2014, Shulman and Bostrom, 2014), but
for now iterated embryo selection remains in the realm of science fiction.
5 While there are reasons to cede reproductive choice to individuals, it is plausible to think that group selection
has been a powerful source of traits that enable human cooperation (Wilson and Wilson, 2007), so the formal
institutions and informal norms that shape our reproductive choices are likely to remain important.
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the liberty of citizens. Norms can be cheaper to enforce than laws because they are
usually backed by moral emotions like guilt and shame, and by psychological incen-
tives like our desire for the esteem we get from other people when we follow social
norms.
The biggest problem with relying solely on norms to shape choices in a way that’s
likely to boost socially beneficial traits is that most of us now live in large cities within
even larger nations. These are not the conditions in which norms tend to be most
effective at coordinating human actions to produce net gains (Ostrom, 2000).
In fact, the reproductive patterns that have emerged in large liberal societies are
neither adaptive nor desirable from the standpoint of human flourishing across gener-
ations. Richerson and Boyd emphasize that in virtually all developed market societies,
maladaptive reproductive norms have taken hold (2005, chapter 5). The core idea is
that although smaller families enable individuals to secure more resources, wealthy
people who enjoy high levels of freedom seem to take less of an interest in using their
resources to produce children. The demographic pattern Richerson and Boyd identify is
partly explained by the cost of raising children in developed countries, including the
opportunities one has to forgo in societies where wealth and leisure time allow us to
pursue intellectually stimulating activities. Moreover, when people we admire have
very few children, the rest of us tend to copy them. Most of us are inclined to follow the
lead of successful and high-status individuals (Henrich, 2015).
Maladaptive reproductive norms in the developed world have led to sub-
replacement fertility – with especially low fertility rates among those with more
education, more income, and a higher IQ.6 This pattern isn’t inevitable, though it
seems to be spreading across the world as educational opportunities for women
increase, along with economic growth and secularization.
1.3 Enhancing Cognition by Altering Institutions
We now explore some ideas for how specific laws and general political institutions
might facilitate the emergence of norms that raise average intelligence.
1.3.1 Family Policy
Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, and Finland have among the most generous
family leave policies in the world – with options for either parent to be compensated for
staying home with children for an extended period after a child is born. Most family
leave policies also contain provisions preventing employers from discriminating against
pregnant women or firing them for taking leave after they have a child. Reducing the
risk that potential parents will experience serious setbacks to their career, in addition to
compensating parents while they care for newborns, could spur a change in social
norms so that it is considered normal, even praiseworthy, for professionals to build a
family.
6 Satoshi Kanazawa (2014) reviews the data and argues that education and IQ do not have an independent
negative correlation with fertility, contrary to what others have found. We do not take a position on this issue.
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Family leave policies may be a good idea simply from the standpoint of justice,
since women’s labor during and after pregnancy generally goes uncompensated, and
the social benefits of smart people having children are widely dispersed. But family
leave laws seem to have only a modest effect on fertility. At first, evidence indicated
that generous family leave policies in Nordic countries were successful at nudging
birthrates up toward replacement levels, in particular by targeting professionals who
otherwise find it difficult to leave a career and take care of children. But since 2009,
fertility rates among native Nordics have declined (even though overall fertility has
stabilized because of higher fertility rates among immigrants from the Middle East and
Africa). In recent years, Hungary has experimented with a package of policies aimed at
boosting fertility in part by encouraging early marriage, and restoring more traditional
marriage patterns. Early evidence suggests that this approach has raised fertility rates,
though not quite to replacement levels (Stone, 2018a).
So far, family leave policies, subsidized childcare, and cash transfers to families who
care for their children at home seem to have a small positive effect on birth rates
(Thevenon and Gauthier, 2010). Recent evidence suggests that women in developed
countries like the US and UK wantmore children than they are having, and that couples
who are married and have a stable income are more likely to achieve their fertility goals
(Stone, 2018b, 2018c). But it is not clear how policies that try to promote marriage and
children specifically affect the fertility of professionals, or what effect they have on the
average intelligence of a country’s population.7
1.3.2 Religious Belief
Religious belief powerfully influences reproductive choices. A century and a half after
Darwin showed us where we come from, religious belief is alive and well across the
world. This is partly because people in countries with high levels of education and
income, which strongly correlate with lower levels of religious belief (e.g. England,
Germany, Japan), have far fewer children than people in countries with low levels of
education and income, and high levels of religious belief (e.g. Sub-Saharan African
countries). It is also true that within developed countries, religious people tend to have
more children than non-religious people. While religious beliefs vary in ways that
matter for fertility, religiosity itself seems to positively affect both the number of
children men and women have, and the number they intend to have (Zhang 2008,
Hayford and Morgan 2009, Peri-Rotem 2016).
To the extent that psychological traits that predict religiosity are heritable, and
strongly correlate with fertility, the world may get more religious in the near future.
As Jonathan Haidt says, “Societies that forgo the exoskeleton of religion should reflect
carefully on what will happen to them over several generations. We don’t really know,
because the first atheistic societies have only emerged in Europe in the last few
decades. They are the least efficient societies ever known at turning resources into
7 Intelligence is highly heritable (Plomin and Deary, 2015) and positively correlated with educational
attainment (Haier, 2016), so we would expect that if professionals had a higher proportion of children, this
would increase the average intelligence of the population. Moreover, some evidence indicates that support
for policies that encourage some people to have more children than others increases when people are presented
with evidence that intelligence, criminality, and occupational status are moderately to highly heritable
(Zigerell, 2019).
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offspring” (2012, p. 313). In fact, religiosity may be an adaptation rather than a
byproduct of other adaptive traits (Atran and Henrich, 2010).8
If these considerations are correct, one way to combat the trend of low fertility
among the cognitively gifted might be to promote religious belief. However, there are
many problems with social norms or public policies that try to promote religious belief.
One problem is the incursion on liberty of thought that it would entail.9 While it is clear
that we should respect and even emulate successful religious groups like Mormons
(who encourage high levels of education and fertility), it is not obvious that religiosity
in general is worth promoting. Some religions might promote norms that benefit their
leaders but not their followers, as cults often do. Others might promote norms that are
good for their group but bad for the broader population. For example, some religious
institutions might select for excessively servile traits, like obedience to authority. Other
religious institutions might select for pro-social traits like a willingness to defer to
impersonal norms that serve the common good, and to punish norm violators.
It is hard to replace religion as a source of meaning in people’s lives. But it is equally
hard to see how a secular analogue could replace religion and spur fertility by providing
the sense of purpose that for many people dissipates when they lose their religious
belief.10
1.3.3 Community Size
We have good reasons to believe that intelligence has network effects, and we
know from behavioral genetics that assortative mating for intelligence is strong
(Plomin and Deary, 2015). In other words, people tend to seek long term mates
who are similar in intelligence to themselves. If people were free to form new
political communities (and set the rules for new entrants), perhaps they would
cluster even more along the lines of intelligence, along with other traits that have
positive network effects. Less successful political communities might then copy
the reproductive norms of more successful communities (though there is no
guarantee this would be good, since currently the most successful communities
also have the lowest birth rates). In this sense, small, stable political communities
might be able to reintroduce group selection in a way that mimics the conditions
that facilitated the spread of favorable psychological traits in the past.11
8 This is partly because religions provide ways of clearly demarcating one’s tribe, create rituals that function as
costly signals and exclusionary mechanisms, and promote beliefs that tend to facilitate cooperation with the
tribe.
9 In a free society, religious leaders have to both mold and reflect the beliefs of their flock in order to maintain
their members.
10 This problem was recognized by Darwin, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky. A character in Dostoevsky’s book
The Brothers Karamazov observes that “The secret of man’s being is not only to live but to have something to
live for. Without a firm conception of the object of life, man would not consent to go on living, and would
rather destroy himself than remain on earth, though he had bread in abundance… Nothing is more seductive
for man that his freedom of conscience, but at the same time nothing is a greater torture” (1879, ch 5, bk 5).
11 Many traits that we value originated in part from inter-group competition (Turchin, 2015), but also through
intra-group mate selection and differential success (Miller, 2007). In preindustrial England, for example, a
large percentage of men who didn’t possess the skills required for economic success – including industrious-
ness – left no surviving offspring (Clark, 2007).
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The original idea behind American federalism is that a national government should
enforce basic Constitutional rights, but smaller states and communities within a nation
should control local affairs. If control over local affairs included the right to set
stringent terms on who is allowed to migrate to the community, citizens of the
community would presumably be more accountable to one another.12
Federalism already exists to some extent. And the concentration of talent in particular
communities is leading to more assortative meeting and mating (Murray, 1996, 2012). But
this is not necessarily leading to the spread of favorable reproductive norms from one
community to another. However, gene-culture co-evolution occurs at a slow enough pace
that it is hard to knowwhich normswill eventually spread andwhichwill die. Biological and
cultural evolution are deeply path-dependent processes, and both are difficult to predict with
any precision. Since current American cities (and cities in most countries) don’t have much
ability to set strong exclusionary terms on citizens, and since social welfare benefits are
accessible to all, the costs of careless reproductive choices are largely externalized.
Although smaller political communities could concentrate talent in one geographic
area, they might not be as economically productive as large nation states. But this isn’t
necessarily true: countries like Singapore and Iceland do quite well with small popu-
lations. As long as citizens in one polity trade with others, the free movement of
products and ideas can occur without the continuous movement of people across
borders, and without the need for massive populations within a particular country. If
small, clearly defined political communities can create more responsive governments
and enjoy higher levels of social innovation, especially when they worry that their
citizens may leave for another political community, it is plausible that their success
would translate to higher economic productivity. Productivity may be a mechanism
through which the norms of one community are copied by other communities, though
again there are no guarantees, especially given current demographic trends.
It may be worth encouraging autonomy among smaller political communities if for
no other reason than John Stuart Mill’s idea that we should encourage experiments in
living (1859). As the evolutionary biologist Joseph Henrich argues, until we understand
psychology and institutions better, “we should take a page from cultural evolution’s
playbook and design ‘variation and selection systems’ that will allow alternative
institutions or organizational forms to compete” (2015, p. 331). Competition would
increase, on this view, if communities had more freedom to experiment, and if people
within communities felt the consequences of their choices more directly (Ellickson,
2001). This could create the emergence of favorable reproductive norms.
1.3.4 Information
If parents knew more about heredity, and about the individual advantages to their
children – as well as the network effects to society – of traits like intelligence, this
12 In the final chapter of Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick (1974) defends the idea that within a
minimal state (the main point of which is to establish private property rights and enforce contracts), we should
honor the autonomy of different experimental political communities. Part of the idea is that no political
community fits everyone’s ideal type, and in order to allow people to avoid paying the costs of programs they
deeply disagree with, we should give communities a greater right to determine who can join their group. This
would involve a strong right to exclude non-members, while give existing members who do not break their
rules freedom of exit.
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information would almost certainly impact their reproductive choices, which would in
turn influence social norms. Informal evidence for this comes from how women select
sperm donors, which reflects an intuitive but imperfect understanding of heredity.
According to a recent study, women tend to select male sperm donors for intelligence
and income (earned income is presumably an indicator of social success), among other
factors (Whyte and Torgler, 2016). This is no surprise, given that intelligence – along
with its corollaries, like creative accomplishment and a sense of humor – is ranked as a
desirable trait in long term mates by both men and women (Miller, 2013).13
A lot of basic science research is not patentable, and therefore not profitable for
firms to undertake (Dalrymple, 2003). This is why government investment in genetics
research can boost the rate of theoretical innovation, and increase the amount of useful
information that biotech firms can translate into useful products that they can tempo-
rarily patent.
Government policy, then, can influence the rate of scientific progress by adjusting IP
rights and funding basic science research that yields discoveries in genetics, computa-
tion, and biochemistry. As we learn more about genetics, and more people use that
knowledge to cognitively enhance their children, their behavior may influence the
reproductive choices of others for two reasons. First, when high status people cogni-
tively enhance their children, others are likely to follow suit. Second, when more
parents enhance their kids, the (opportunity) cost of declining to enhance will grow.
While genetic enhancement might become a positional good with decreasing returns
and increasing costs, below some threshold cognitive enhancement is likely to lead to
gains in economic productivity and social welfare, provided we can preserve cognitive
diversity (Anomaly et al., 2019).
2 Conclusion
Social norms and political institutions have sculpted populations through gene-culture co-
evolution. Just as our genes predispose us to create certain kinds of cultures, culture can
influence which genes are likely to find their way into future bodies. According to Joseph
Henrich, “to the degree that we aremore cooperative than other mammalian species (andwe
are), it’s because culturally evolved norms constructed social environments that, over eons,
penalized and gradually weeded out aggressive, antisocial types (norm violators) while
rewarding the more sociable and docile among us” (2015, p. 154). We have offered some
tentative suggestions for how political institutions and public policies might give rise to
norms that nudge people (without forcing them) to reproduce in ways that increase the
prevalence of traits that bolster human welfare. If selecting for cognitive abilities becomes a
social norm, social cooperation may very well increase as a byproduct. However, our
suggestions are tentative because our information is limited, our political institutions are
imperfect, and the relevant sciences are still developing.
13 Interestingly, recent studies suggest that being in the 90th percentile of intelligence is most attractive, but as
we go above this, attractiveness tends to flatten and even decline a bit (Gignac and Starbuck, 2019; Gignac
et al., 2018). It may be, however that when we move from the mating market to the fertility clinic different
traits will be selected. What we want in a partner and in a child may be related, but the fertility clinic isn’t
hampered by an individual’s ability to attract and retain a partner.
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